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The term "citizen of the United States" first appears in those
articles of the Constitution of the United States which provide
for the qualifications of members of Congress and of the President.
The phrase was first suggested by Mr. Pinckney in the Federal
Convention of 1787,1 but in none of the discussions of that body
do we find any attempt to define its meaning, though it seems to
have been taken for granted that a citizen of any State was nec-
essarily a citizen of the United States.
2 The United States of
America had existed for many years before the adoption of the
Federal Constitution. That name had been assumed in the Dec-
laration of Independence and repeated in the Articles of Confed-
eration. Since the States retained their original sovereignty as
to all matters of internal concern it could only have been their
citizens to whom the Constitution referred as those who had been
for nine years citizens of the United States. But that a citizen of
the United States must thereafter always be a citizen of a State
was obviously not true. A naturalized alien, a resident in" territory
of the United States outside of any particular State, or of the District
of Columbia, might be a citizen of the United States without being
a citizen of any State. But of so little importance was the case of
such persons considered that no provision was made to give the
ordinary Courts of the United States jurisdiction over controversies
1 5 Elliot's Debates, 129.
2 See remarks of Mr. Sherman and Mr. Wilson, ibid. 412, 414.
3 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 167.
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to which they might be parties. This anomalous condition of
things was commented on by Chief Justice Marshall early in the
century as "extraordinary," 4 but has remained unaltered to the
present time. As soon, however, as a naturalized alien took up
his residence in any State, it was held that he became a citizen of
that .State, though not necessarily an elector of it. 5
The inhabitants of a conquered or ceded territory may also by
treaty acquire, if they remain upon the soil, the character of cit-
izens .of the United States.6
In 1821, the meaning of the term under discussion came
before William Wirt, as attorney general of the United States.
A colored man was in command of a coasting vessel, which, under
our statutes, could only be commanded by a citizen of the United
States. Mr. Wirt's opinion was that the statute did not include
free colored persons, as those of that class were not generally
recognized as citizens, at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion.
7
In 1843, however, Attorney General Legar6 came to a con-
trary conclusion, upon the construction of a statute as to the pre-
emption of public lands by citizens of the United States.8
In 1849, and again in 1856, Chief Justice Taney had occasion
to consider much the same question and from different points of
view. In the Passenger Cases, 9 which stretch their weary length
over nearly two hundred pages of our reports, the chief justice
was one of the dissenting minority. In his opinion after premis-
ing that (p. 482) "every citizen of a State is also a citizen of the
United States," he uses this language (p. 492):
"Living as we do under a common government, charged with the great
concerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the United States from the most
remote States or Territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the principal
departments established at Washington, but also to its judicial authorities and
public offices in every State and Territory of the Union. * * * For all the
great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one peo-
ple, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and,
as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass
through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."
In the second case referred to, which arose seven years later,
the chief justice, now speaking for the majority of the court,
4 Hepburn v. Elzey, 2 Cranch., 445.
5 Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761.
6 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 533.
7 i Opinions of the Attorneys General, p. 5o6.
8 4 id. 147.
!9 7 How. 283.
HeinOnline  -- 2 Yale L.J. 86 October 1892-June 1893
THE CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STA TES.
brought all his great learning and force of reasoning to bear
upon the determination of the right to citizenship of a free colored
person. It was the "Dred Scott case,"
10 to which more than to
any other publication, unless it be " Uncle Tom's Cabin," may
be attributed the outbreak, in i86o, of the Civil War. The
leading positions taken in his opinion, as to the matter now in
question, were thus expressed:
"The words ' people of the United States,' and ' citizens,' are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body, who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They
are what we familiarly call the ' sovereign people,' and every citizen is one of
this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty (p. 404). * * *
"In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizen-
ship, which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizen-
ship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he
has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen
of the United States (p. 405). * * *
"The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish an uni-
form rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has
always been held by this Court to be so. Consequently no State, since the
adoption of the Constitution, can by naturalizing an alien invest him with the
rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the federal govern-
ment, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly
be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immu-
nities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.
"It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its
own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member
into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States.
It cannot make him a member of this community by making him a member of
its own. And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or descrip-
tion of persons, who were not intended to be embraced in this new political
family, which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be
excluded from it.
"The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in
relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State
should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this
country, or who might afterwards be imported, who was then or should
afterwards be made free in any State, and put it in the power of a single
State to make him a citizen of the United States and endue him with the full
rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent? (pp. 405, 406).
"It is true, every person and every class and description of person, who
were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, recognized as citizens in
the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none
other; it was formed by them and for them and their posterity, but for no one
else" (p. 406).
10 i9 How. 393.
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A different view was taken by Mr. Justice Curtis, in an able
dissenting opinion, his conclusion being that "those persons born
within the several States, who, by force of their respective consti-
tutions and laws, are citizens of the State, are thereby citizens of
the United States" (p. 582).
In 1862, in the second year of the civil war, the construction
of the navigation laws asserted by Mr. Wirt, was overruled by
Attorney General Bates11 in a somewhat verbose and effusive
opinion, the pith of which was that "the Constitution uses the
word ' citizen' only to express the political quality of the individ-
ual in his relation to the nation," that any citizen of a State was
necessarily a citizen of the United States, and that any citizen of
the United States, who was domiciled in a State, was a citizen of
that State.
The Civil Rights bill of i866, passed over the President's veto,
sought to settle these controversies forever by declaring all per-
sons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians'not taxed, to be citizens of the United
States. Its constitutionality was seriously questioned, and a few
months later the XIVth amendment to the Constitution was pro-
posed, which commences with a still broader provision, making
all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
its jurisdiction, citizens of the United States and also of the States
wherein they reside.
Before this amendment was passed, came the case of Cran-
dall v. Nevada,12 in which it was jield that a State tax on travelers
passing through its territory, abridged the right of a citizen of the
United States to go freely to and from any place, from the seat of
government to the remotest land office, where the functions of the
United States were being discharged, as well as to the various
courts of the States, in which his right to sue was guaranteed by
the National Constitution.
The interval between the adoption of the XIIIth and the pro-
posal of the XIVth amendment had been marked by legislation in
the Southern States, designed, under the guise of repressing
vagrancy and regulating contracts of employment, to keep the
colored race there in a subject condition. The main purpose of
the XIVth amendment was to lift the freedmen into the acknowl-
edged position of American citizens. 18
11 io Opinions of the Attorneys General, p. 382.
12 6 Wall. 35, 43.
13 The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 73.
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The adoption of this amendment in x868 was the first authori-
tative declaration in our history (excepting the statutes of 1802,
Rev. Stat., Sec. 2172, and of 1855 , Sec. 1993, as to children of
Americans born abroad) of what constituted a citizen of the
United States.
It was now to be determined what were his rights and privi-
leges.
The partial definition given in Crandall v. Nevada was thus
enlarged in 1872 in the Slaughter House cases: 14
"Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care
and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty and property
when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government. Of
this there can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his character as a
citizen of the United States. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of Aabeas corfius, are rights of
the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the nav-
igable waters of the United States, however they may penetrate the territory
of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign
nations are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizen-
ship of a State. One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under
consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition,
become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein,
with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be added
the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and
by the other clause of the fourteenth, next to be considered."
The other clause to be considered was that prohibiting the
States from depriving any person of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law, or denying to any person within itstjuris-
diction the equal protection of its laws. Obviously the word
"person," as here used, comprehends more than "citizen." Any
person, whether natural or artificial, native or alien, is within its
meaning.
A majority of the court inclined to the position (p. 8i) that so
far as the equal protection of the laws was concerned, the prohibition
would never be held to apply to any State action not directed
against negroes, as such. A broader view, however, was taken by
Mr. Justice Field in a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Chief
Justice Chase, Mr. Justice Swayne, and Mr. Justice Bradley. To
them, the XIVth amendment seemed to make a most important
change in the source of American citizenship. It had, save
in exceptional cases, sprung from the State as its fountain. It
was now to spring from the United States, in every instance, and
what was more, it was to involve the acquisition of citizenship in
14 Ibid. 79.
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the State. Citizens might be forced upon the State, without its
consent, in every case of residence within its limits of a citizen of the
United States. One sovereign was henceforth to make citizens of
another sovereign. In the language of Mr. Justice Field (p. 95)
"a citizen of a State is now only a citizen of the United States,
residing in that State." "It is now settled," said Mr. Justice
Bradley (p. ii 2), "that citizenship of the United States is the pri-
mary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is
secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the
United States, and the citizen's place of residence." It necessarily
followed from these positions that the fundamental rights of citi-
zenship, such as those secured by Mfagna Charta, including right
to choose and pursue any lawful employment, unrestrained by
monopolies, were now, whether claimed by white or black, all
under the direct protection of the United States (p. 123).
While, however, the State has no right to refuse admission to
its citizenship to any citizens of the United States residing within
its limits, such citizens have a right to decline the grant. The
citizen of one State may reside in another without surrendering
his native domicile, and, in such case, though a citizen of the
United States, he does not become a citizen of the State of his
residence. 15
The tendency of judicial opinion, since the decision of the
Slaughter House Cases, has been against that restriction of the
benefit of the prohibitions of the XIVth amendment to the negro
race, towards which the majority of the Supreme Court then
inclined. On the other hand, it has been against what seems to
have been substantially the contention of the minority, that the
rights of an American were now mainly dependent or consequent
on his citizenship in the United States. In the words of Chief
Justice Fuller: "Protection to life, liberty, and property rests
primarily with the States, and the amendment furnishes an addi-
tional guaranty against any encroachment by the States upon
those fundamental rights, which belong to citizenship, and which
the State governments were created to secure." 16
This was brought prominently out in the final disposition
made of the Civil Rights Act. The Act of 1866, the invalidity of
which had been asserted by the State Courts, 17 had been replaced
15 Bradwell v. State, i6 Wall. 138; Sharon V. Hill, 26 Fed. Rep. 337, 344;
Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646, 649.
16 In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448.
17 Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 2 Bush (Ky.) 15.
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by another of a similar tenor in I87o, and that in turn by another
in 1875. It was the latter which was declared unwarranted by
the XIVth amendment in the Civil Rights Cases, 18 the Court
holding, though with vigorous dissent from Mr. Justice Harlan
(p. 52) that it must be construed, in the light of the Xth amend-
ment, as giving Congress only a corrective power, and not any right
of primary legislation for the establishment of individual rights.
There are certainly some difficulties in harmonizing this doctrine
with that of the Virginia and West Virginia jury cases decided
four years earlier, in which State laws were held invalid, as
against persons of color, which excluded all of their race from the
jury box. It is true, said the court, that the language of the
XIVth amendment is prohibitory, but every prohibition implies
the existence of rights and immunities, prominent among which
is an immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life,
liberty or property. 9 This immunity, however, seems to have
been regarded as one attaching to any person, whether a
citizen or not, and as was clearly shown in the dissenting opinion
of Justices Field and Clifford, if the right to serve on juries were
an incident of citizenship, it would belong to women and children
as well as men.20 The same argument is conclusive against the
claim that the right to vote is inherent in every citizen of the
United States. 21
The XVth amendment, while not conferring the right of
suffrage on persons of color, does guaranty them an immunity
from such discrimination on the part of their States as must fol-
low from laws granting the right to whites only. This is a new
constitutional right appurtenant to national citizenship.22
The original draft of this amendment, introduced by Senator
Henderson of Missouri, was that no State should deny "the right
of its citizens to vote," on account of color, and the judiciary com-
mittee of the Senate gave it its present form, by which it operates
in favor of citizens of the United States, and against a denial of
suffrage on equal terms, whether "by the United States or any
State." In view of the history of this legislation, Mr. Justice
Hunt, in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Reese, main-
tained that it covered mere municipal elections, and that Congress
18 109 U. S. 3, 15.
19 Strauder v. West Virginia, 1oo U. S. 303, 3O.
20 Exfiarle Virginia, IOO U. S. 339, 365.
21 Minor vz. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 171.
-22 U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217.
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could make its election and enforcement laws extend to them, not-
withstanding no Federal officer was to be voted for.28
The rights given by the XVth amendment have been guarded
by the Enforcement Act of 1870 (Rev. Stat., Sections 55o8 and
5520), and it is thereby made a criminal offense to conspire to
deter any citizen by threat or force from their exercise.2
There is a right belonging to the citizens of every free govern-
ment to assemble peaceably to discuss political matters, or frame
petitions for change of laws, and this is one of the rights of citi-
zens of the United States.28
They have no such inherent right of assembly, with arms, or
of association for military purposes. Congress may permit it for
purposes of national defense, but if so, it must rest on and be
regulated by the statute law.
26
The citizen of the United States has, as such, no right to
engage in any particular pursuit within any State, which its laws
restrict for reasons of public policy to certain classes of persons.
A woman, therefore, though a citizen as fully as a man, has no
right to admission to the bar of any State, if it sees fit to confine
such admission to men.27
The right of trial by jury in State courts also, is no incident
of national citizenship, and it may be denied, without infringing
the guaranties of due process of law which are given by the
XIVth amendment.2 8  This conclusion was reached by the
Supreme Court of the United States, against the dissent of Jus-
tices Field and Clifford, who apparently must have considered the
right of trial by a jury of one's peers to stand on a different ground
from that of eligibility to jury service, and to be one of the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no
State can abridge.
Nor does the Constitution of the United States make it a right of
its citizens, as such, to testify in its courts. It is their duty if called
upon by proper authority, but it is not a constitutional privilege.
The XIVth amendment seeks to protect individuals both in
their civil and their political rights, but its provisions in defense of
28U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 248.
24 Exfarte Yarbrough, xo U. S. 657.
25 U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552.
28 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 267.
27 Bradwell v. State, z6 Wall. 130, 139,142 (Chief Justice Chase dissenting).
28 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92.
29 U. S. v. Sanges, 48 Fed. Rep. 78, 87.
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their civil rights are much the broader. These it aims to secure
to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, free
from improper interference by State authority, whether such
persons are natural or artificial, Americans or foreigners.
It has compelled each State to count among its citizens
many whom its own laws had before excluded. It presents the
anomaly of one sovereign's forcing subjects upon another while
they yet retain their original allegiance, and so may be guilty of
treason to either or both.80 But it leaves these new-made citizens
to find most of their privileges and immunities in the laws and
institutions of the State into which they have been thrust.
"1 The privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States ate those which arise out of the nature and essential char-
acter of the National Government, the provisions of its Constitu-
tion, or its laws and treaties rgade in pursuance thereof." 81
They are few in number, though great in importance.
Those granted by the Constitution have been sufficiently con-
sidered.
Treaty stipulations have often constituted large bodies of men
citizens of the United States, or given them equal rights with citi-
zens, as to succession to property and personal security; but in a
brief article like the present, it is impossible to refer to them in
detail.
As to congressional legislation, the main statutory rights of
citizens of the United States are these: To hold and convey
property, real and personal, in any State and Territory as freely as
its own white citizens (Rev. Stat., Sec. 1978); To the exclusive
ownership and command of American shipping (Sec. 4131); To
vote and hold office in the several Territories (Sec. 186o); To
pre-empt i6o acres of public land (See. 2259), and gain a home-
stead (Sec. 2289); To passports for foreign travel (Sec. 4076); To
the prompt intervention of the President in case of their unjust
arrest by a foreign government (Sec. 2001); To renounce their
citizenship by removal to a foreign country and acquiring citizen-
ship there (Sec. 1999).
32
The citizen of the United States has a right to its protection to
secure him the free exercise of any of these rights and privileges,
80 People v. Lynch, 2o Johns. 549.
81 Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, I6o.
32 Charles Green's Son v. Salas, 31 Fed. Rep. io6.
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and Congress has properly made any forcible interference with
them a criminal offense. 3
If a question arises in a State court as to whether a person is a
citizen of the United States, and it is decided in the negative, he
can have this denial of the right or quality which he claims
reviewed on writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United
States. 34
There is no difference in right between the native-born citizen
and the naturalized alien, except that the latter cannot be made.
president or vice-president of the United States. Congress may
prescribe the mode of naturalization, but not its effects.35
It has taken a century and a civil war to settle, even in this
imperfect way, the status of the citizen of the United States.
American jurisprudence has few clearer examples of that disin-
clination towards attempting exhaustive definitions of political or
legal rights, which it has inherited from English sources and the
Colonial era.
The privileges of American citizenship on American soil, as
distinguished from those of State citizenship, were hardly thought
of until the Civil War had done its nationalizing work. They
would have remained largely a matter of sentiment, then, had it
not been for the new conditions and controversies precipitated by
the enfranchisement of the colored race. By fundamental alter-
ations in our Constitution, they have acquired a new dignity and
power, but their ultimate range and scope have been left for
the future to determine by the slow growth of national institutions.
3U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76.
34 Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. i35 (Field J. dissenting, 183).
35 Stone v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 827.
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